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Abstract. A jurisdiction such as the Scottish one, reputedly with solid Roman roots, is practically bereft of the fundamental concept of a 
deposit in the concluding passage of the missives. Conversely, the relevant ‘ancestor’ (Roman law) has been profoundly permeated, 
throughout the course of its history, by the notion of an arrha (the earnest) in the conclusion of a contract annexed to the transfer of heritable 
properties. Moreover, in contemporary times and outwith Scotland, a Continental jurisdiction (the Italian one) is resolutely lingering on the 
Roman caparra penitenziale while, ironically, the English system (comprehensively ‘un-Roman’ in its formation) has expressly adopted the 
‘deposit’ as part of the closing particulars. 
These asymmetries, brim-full with inviting legal ingredients, seem, in the present work, to conjure up an intriguing and captivating plot 
worthy of an Indiana Jones' film, where the lost treasure can be deemed replaceable, for the distracted reader, by the ancient Roman notion 
of an arrha, so evidently not inherited by the contemporary Scottish jurisprudence. Ultimately, the contribution engenders the usual 
unsettling query: in the light of the phenomenology of the arrha so neglected in Scotland in contemporary times, is Scottish law still a 
mixed legal system or, conversely, a jurisdiction progressively getting closer to the English common law counterpart? 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of missives – a peculiarity of the Scottish legal system as opposed to its Anglo-Welsh 
counterpart which traditionally lacks any such analogy – is put under the microscope and duly 
analysed in this work, both from the peculiar perspective of a comparative analysis with civil law 
jurisprudence (the Italian jurisdiction is adopted as a yardstick), from which missives have been 
conceptually borrowed, and through a diachronic investigation into its Roman ancestor. 
In respect to the payment of the deposit - a sum usually amounting to a fraction of the agreed price - 
that some jurisdictions allow and/or require the purchaser to pay before the conclusion of a contract 
for the transfer of a property (both English and Italian jurisdictions bear testimony to this practice), 
Scots law basically ignores such procedure save for limited exceptions in the sale of commercial 
estates or new properties, the latter case commanding a deposit tantamount to a reservation fee.1 
Among a more authoritative calibre of contemporary Commentators ‘North of the Border’, it is not 
neglected - and to a certain extent is recognised - that ‘the law about deposits [in Scotland] in sale 
contracts is in some respects unclear’, with its rationale behind even considered ‘obscure’2. This is 
deemed particularly so in cases where (conceptually) such a sum was to be qualified, as actually had 
already occurred judicially in some circumstances,3 as a ‘security for the performance’, rather than a 
‘partial payment’, with the ensuing inextricable contradictions. In this respect, it is appropriately 
annotated that ‘the law of rights in security has a well-known principle … that a security is 
enforceable only to the extent of the obligation secured. Hence to classify a deposit as a security 
would lead to the conclusion that if the buyer defaults then the deposit is lost only to the extent of the 
                                                            
1 G L Gretton and KGC Reid, Conveyancing (4th edn W. Green 2011) 71. 
2 G L Gretton and KGC Reid (n 1) 71. Additionally, in the only contemporary textbook dedicated to the 
missives in Scotland - DJ Cusine and R Rennie, Missives (2nd edn Law Society of Scotland/Butterworths 1999) 
-, no mention seems to be made to the concept of deposit. 
3 Zemhunt (Holdings) Ltd v Control Securities Ltd (1992) SLT 151. 
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loss of the seller. If a deposit is wholly forfeited that is presumably because it is to be regarded not as 
a security but as a pre-payment that is subject to an express right to the seller to take it by way of 
liquidated damages.’4  
There are plausible grounds for advocating, from a mere academic perspective, the need for a minute 
tweaking of the Scottish legislation so as to give missives a more credible enforceability. The means 
of achieving this end, as proposed in this work, would be to look at the concept of the ‘deposit’ or 
‘earnest’ and, more specifically, at the Roman law arrha or the synonym arra, both within its Roman 
roots and in its application within a typical civil law jurisdiction, in this case the Italian one. The 
ultimate goal of the discussion is not to pretentiously solicit a fundamental transplant into the Scottish 
system of a similar concept existing in a foreign legislation, but rather to take stock of some aspects 
illustrated by both the ‘ancestor’ and the ‘comparator’ to possibly elicit some inspiration as to how to 
improve some aspects emanating from the entrenched concept of missives in Scotland. 
 
2. Scottish missives: an overview 
The ‘derivative acquisition’ of property rights in force of a contract of sale, to be entered into between 
seller and purchaser through a bargaining process which is sometimes very complex, 5  is the 
commonest form of a transmission of corporeal movables, the ‘original one’ being conversely more 
rarely connected to the fact that ‘a right comes into being as a consequence of an act or occurrence 
giving a new proprietary position.’6 
It is usually affirmed that Scotland, differently from England and Wales, affords the seller of a 
heritable property a ‘safe harbour’ approach for the reason that, ‘North of the Border’, the closing of 
any transaction is preceded by missives. This should be the magical, laconic and exotic word 7 
defining the two letters exchanged by the solicitor of the seller and that of the buyer, as a result of 
                                                            
4 G L Gretton and KGC Reid (n 1) 71. 
5  The empirical explanation of this process may be read in JH Sinclair and E Sinclair, Handbook of 
Conveyancing Practice in Scotland (5th edn Tottel Publishing 2006).  
6 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (Thomson/W. Green 2007) 702. 
7 Missiva in Latin means letter, and the relevant nominative plural is missivae. 
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which the two parties commit themselves to finalise the transfer, within the deadline specified in the 
missives themselves. Therefore, the payment of the price to the seller and the delivery of the title 
documents to the purchaser, although – it must be said – it is the third stage, the registration with the 
land register, that marks the transfer of the ownership between the two parties. At this final stage, the 
real right is created in the purchaser. 8  
It is also endorsed that in Scotland the missives are the collection of written communications 
‘beginning with an offer and ending with an acceptance and, in between, documenting a process of 
adjustments in which the terms of the contract are fined-tuned.’9 Differently from the usual bargaining 
process, this negotiation occurs via a refusal and counter-offer, instead of an offer and qualified 
acceptance.10 With less technical terminology, it is also affirmed that missive is ‘the name we give to 
the contract for the sale and purchase of heritable property in Scotland that is constituted by a series of 
formal letters entered into by or on behalf of a purchaser and a seller dealing with the conditions that 
are to apply to the purchase and sale.’11 
Yet, it is recognised that the rights conferred through the missives are merely personal rather than 
real.12 Remarkably, in Scotland, differently from England, it is particularly rare for sellers to demand 
a deposit upon signing the missives. It is said that the main reason for this is that ‘it is assumed that 
the solicitors acting for buyers will have done at least preliminary check on their clients’ finances.’ 13 
In reality, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, no formal obligation lies on the solicitor of the 
purchaser to check the finances of his own client on the verge of buying a property. Correctly it is 
emphasised among Scottish Commentators14 that ‘it is good practice to make reasonably sure (a) that 
the clients will be able to come up with the purchase price at settlement date and (b) that they will be 
                                                            
8 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (n 6) 655. 
9 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (n 6) 654-655. 
10 Gloag and Henderson, ibid. 
11 E Sinclair and A Stewart, Conveyancing Practice in Scotland (6th edn Bloomsbury Professional 2011). 
12 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (n 6) 655.  
13 GL Gretton and KGC Reid (n 1) 35.  
14 GL Gretton and KGC Reid (n 1) 35. 
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able to keep up with the monthly loan payments thereafter.’15 However, this audit is not a mandatory 
task bestowed on the solicitor of the purchaser, it is merely ‘good practice’.  
At this stage of the analysis, two specific aspects are worthy of a discussion and interpretation: first, 
the deposit (or arra) and the way this concept has been historically applied to the missives; second 
and in connection with the previous point, the missives and their traditional binding nature. These 
aspects shall be discussed and analysed in the following two Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. 
2.1. The history of the deposit in the missives in Scotland: an evolution (or an 
involution?) 
As regards the first aspect, a historical view on the Scots deposit within the missives is necessary from 
the very beginning.  
It is trite view that the Regiam Majestatem reflects the law applicable in Scotland in the 16th century.16 
In the Regiam Majestatem, the deposit – and particularly the Roman arrha – does appear to be well 
perceived. As regards the specific point of the arrha, it is affirmed in that legal source that the sale in 
Scotland was supposed to be binding not simply by consent alone but only with the payment of the 
earnest, although the payment of the earnest did not prevent the buyer from withdrawing from the 
contract, on forfeiture of the earnest given.17 At judicial level a decisum dating back to 1629, Gibson v 
Russel18, seems to confirm this. In this case, as reminded by a contemporary Author19, it was held:  
‘The buying of victual, or any other goods or gear, where the prices are condescended on, and arles 
received20, and the day of delivery appointed, may not be resiled from.’ 
The statement in comment may demonstrate an assumption: the common use of the deposit (or arra) 
in the contract of sale was followed in its entirety in Scotland at the very beginning of its legal 
                                                            
15 Emphasis not per original text. 
16 See WM Gordon, ‘Sale’ in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland vol II 
Obligations (Oxford University Press 2005) 305-332, particularly 306-307. For a general overview, see also R 
White, ID Willock and HL MacQueen, The Scottish Legal System (5th edn Bloomsbury 2013). 
17WM Gordon (n 16) 305-332, particularly 306-307. 
18 1 B.S. 276. 
19 AJ Mackenzie Stuart, Contract and Quasi Contract, in Various Authors, An Introduction to Scottish Legal 
History vol XX (The Law Stair Society 1958). 
20 Emphasis added. 
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tradition. However, things significantly change later. Among the Institutional Writers, Stair, 
Institutions, I, 14, 3, does refer to the ‘English’ earnest rather, but not any longer to the Roman arrha. 
He reminds that it is still dubious whether its nature is ‘an evidence of the bargain closed and 
perfected’ or, conversely, a means of allowing ‘the giver of the earnest ... to resile from the bargain if 
he please to lose his earnest, and the taker ... to resile if he returns the earnest with as much more.’ 
Despite this, Stair’s propensity seems to be for the former conclusion: the ‘…earnest is so 
inconsiderable, that it cannot be thought to be the meaning of the parties to leave the bargain arbitrary, 
upon the losing or doubling thereof.’ ‘Earnest also is reckoned as a part of the price with us, and 
thereby it stands not in nudis finibus contractus, nec est res integra; so that neither party can resile 
therefrom.’  
To similar conclusions comes Erskine, III, Title 3, 5. This Institutional Writer too attempts to address 
and clarify the phenomenon of the deposit in Scotland, albeit merely in connection to the general 
contract of sale or, to put in Latin, the emptio venditio.  
However, after Stair and Erskine, in the 19th century Bell21, in referring to the contract of sale of 
heritable properties, does not linger any longer on the analysis of the deposit. Likewise, the same main 
nineteenth century Scottish textbook in the matter of the sale,22 in dealing with the sale of immovable 
property, does not refer to the Roman arrha or any correspondent Civilian concept such as the deposit. 
It is affirmed in a more laconic way that the writing is not required as a proof, ‘but as a solemnity 
without which the contract will not be binding, even although its existence were admitted, or offered 
to be proved aliunde, Eskine, 3.2.2.’23  
And also: 
‘Where the contract is in the form of an offer and acceptance, or of mutual missives, both writings 
must be probative, otherwise either party may resile, and consequently a written offer, verbally 
accepted, is not binding ...’ 
                                                            
21 Principles 272-279. 
22 MP Brown, Treatise on the Law of Sale (Balfour & Clarke 1821). 
23 MP Brown, ibid. 55. 
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Additionally, it is specified with reference to informal contract24, albeit without any mention of the 
arrha: 
‘The right of resiling, from an informal contract for the sale of heritage, continues only while matters 
are entire. If a part of the price has been paid on the faith of the bargain, the rei interventus supplies 
the want of form, and creates a valid obligation’. 
Ultimately, what described in this Section 2.1 may corroborate the view25 that the deposit or earnest in 
Scotland is a concept progressively and inexorably fading away also as a result of the political 
integration started as from 1707. 
2.2. The binding nature of the missives in Scotland: a myth? 
Commentators constantly affirm that missives, usually concluded via two agents representing the two 
respective contracting parties,26 render the obligations enforceable inter partes. This is due to the fact 
that, in cases where the purchaser decided not to fulfil his own obligations (ie to pay the price), the 
counterparty could rescind the contract and sue the other party for damages.  
From a practical point of view, it can be briefly reminded27 that, colloquially, the phenomenon of the 
purchaser finding a different seller at a lower price for a similar res is called for a correspondent 
property, is usually defined to ‘gazunder’ o ‘gazundering’. Conversely, the seller residing because he 
finds a different purchaser available to pay more for a similar property, is called ‘to gazump’ or 
‘gazumping’. 
From a legal point of observation, the damages that the aggrieved buyer is entitled to claim would 
typically amount to the difference between (a) the price at which the property has been sold, after the 
withdrawal from the contract and its reinstatement in the market, and - if higher – (b) the price at 
                                                            
24 MP Brown, ibid. 55. 
25 See later the Conclusions. 
26 Obviously, in this case, given the general rule of agency, the contract signed ‘by an agent duly authorised on 
behalf of a disclosed principal binds the principal only, and not the agent; otherwise, the agent is personally 
bound.’ D Brand, AJM Steven and S Wortley, Professor McDonald’s Conveyancing Manual (7th edn 
LexisNexis Butterworths 2004) 538. 
27 HL MacQueen e J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (3rd edn Bloomsbury Professional 2012) 65. 
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which the buyer had initially committed himself pursuant to the unfulfilled missives to buy it. The 
legal expenses in which the aggrieved party (the seller) has incurred shall be the additional item of 
this ‘bill’. Judicially, an example of this dynamic is given by a recent case, FM Finnieston Ltd v 
Ross.28 Alternatively, the seller may decide to sue for implement, therefore ‘by an action for payment 
of the purchase price in exchange for which the seller tenders a disposition’.29 However, it must be 
said that this action seems to be less likely. 
It is obvious that, mutatis mutandis, a legal action is nonetheless levied on the buyer in a scenario 
where the seller decided not to settle the transaction, the right of the purchaser substantiated in the 
entitlement against the seller ‘to have the bargain implemented’30 More specifically, the default by the 
seller can be remedied through an action of implement in force of which ‘the purchaser will attempt to 
have the seller ordained to deliver a valid disposition, or, failing that, to acquire a title by 
adjudication.’31 Otherwise, the damages to be awarded judicially, if the seller was not in a position to 
implement the contract at all. This second circumstance may occur in cases where the seller lacks title 
and therefore no alternative option is available.32 It is also said among Commentators that in these 
circumstances the person who enters into the contract to purchase land et similia does not have ‘a real 
right against all and sundry: he is in fact the owner until the conveyance to him has been placed on the 
register.’33 
If this is, theoretically speaking, the general picture typically and earnestly painted in describing the 
transfer of ‘property’ in Scotland,34 in reality, from a more empirical perspective, the risk is not 
inconceivable that the ‘binding’ missives may result in a misleading and ultimately mischievous 
ambush of one of the parties, more often of the seller rather than the buyer. In fact, the former may 
erroneously think that his property shall be sold, after the conclusion of the missives (because of the 
                                                            
28 [2009] CSOH 48. The case is commented on KGC Reid and GL Gretton, Conveyancing 2009 (Avizandum 
2010) 4-5. 
29 D Brand, AJM Steven and S Wortley, Professor McDonald’s Conveyancing Manual (n 26) passim. 
30 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (n 6) 702.  
31 D Brand, AJM Steven and S Wortley, Professor McDonald’s Conveyancing Manual (n 26) 587. 
32 D Brand, AJM Steven and S Wortley, Professor McDonald’s Conveyancing Manual (n 26) 588. 
33 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (n 6) 702. 
34 Needless to say, in this work, ‘property’ must be read as the right of ownership or the res (the thing) which is 
the subject of the right of ownership.  
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alleged binding nature of them), and he will receive due consideration of that sale. However, this 
scenario does not take into account a variety of possible legal devices that the buyer could figure out.  
Among these stratagems, reference could be made to a person ultimately interested in buying the 
property but legally committed via a third party, a ‘man of straw’, without creditworthiness, who is 
acting on behalf of the former. To probe deeper into this sequence of events,35 if for some reason the 
prospective real buyer decided after the signing of the missives not to fund the ostensive buyer for the 
purposes of the payment of the price, would the seller be actually and practically satisfied with what, 
at present but also historically, Scots law would offer him, ie a legal proceeding to be brought against 
the non-performing party, the buyer? In all likelihood, the answer would be no.  
The buyer, at least the ostensive one (he who formally but not substantially committed himself), does 
not have creditworthiness. Therefore, the laborious legal action, albeit successful in its outcome, 
would end up merely a Pyrrhic victory for the seller; ultimately, the latter would be bereft of any 
practical possibility to enforce the assets of the non-performing counterparty to recover his damages. 
Similarly, it seems that the aggrieved party cannot rely either on any action against his own solicitor, 
for the reason that, in Scotland, among the duties by which a solicitor is burdened during the 
bargaining process conducive to the sale of a heritable property, the credit check of the counterparty is 
not encompassed.36  
More explicitly, Commentators37 go beyond by warning of the following: 
‘… the agent, when making an offer on behalf of a named principal, warrants his authority, although 
he does not warrant that his principal is solvent nor that his principal will duly carry out the contract.’ 
Conversely, a duty of care is owed merely by the solicitor of the purchaser to his client. This duty is 
mainly centred on the res: the good to be transferred and, more specifically, physical conditions of the 
house et cetera. However, this does not extend to the creditworthiness of the prospective buyer and, 
                                                            
35 Empirically, one could think of a young un-creditworthy child of a very wealthy person.  
36R Rennie, Opinions on Professional Negligence in Conveyancing The Opinions of Professor Robert Rennie 
(Thompson/W. Green 2004) passim.  
37 D Brand, AJM Steven and S Wortley, Professor McDonald’s Conveyancing Manual (n 26) 538. 
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more in general, no duty is owed to the seller or his legal representative. Ultimately, this duty, as it is 
currently written, does not offer proper safeguards to the benefit of the seller.38 
Some websites seem to testify the incredulity and surprise, in some cases accompanied by a certain 
degree of desperate discomfort, of some sellers in Scotland, who, after the conclusion of the missives, 
had got to realise that, despite the ostensive binding nature of them, the transaction could not be 
perfected. 39  This contribution, from a more theoretical perspective, attempts to offer a legal 
explanation of this: it is not a common phenomenon; however, it is a circumstance that cannot be 
ruled out in the sale and purchase of properties.  
 
3. The lost Scottish concept of the deposit in the missives: a 
‘security’, a forfeiture clause or a tertium genus?   
 
The deposit, lato sensu considered, would not be so extraneous to the theory of contract in Scotland; 
liquidated damages clauses may already be embedded within any contract, therefore also those 
concerning the transfer of heritable properties. Doctrinally, it is said that a ‘liquidated damages clause 
is ... a clause providing a mechanism whereby the damages payable may be calculated and made 
liquid ...’,40 therefore ‘a sum of money which is fixed in amount and payable now’.41 
The liquidated damages are opposed to the illiquid ones. The latter is any other sum, for instance, by 
definition, prior to any assessment by the court, damages.42 Also, it is a quite well-established concept 
in Scots law that ‘the law of penalties’ somehow restricts the use of these clauses, in order that they 
                                                            
38 G L Gretton and KGC Reid (n 1) 12-14. 
39 See, for instance, Money Saving Expert, ‘Missives Signed Buyer still Pulled Out’ (Scotland) 
<http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?t=4003437> accessed  5 November 2015. 
40 HL MacQueen and J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (2nd edn Tottel Publishing 2007) 245, and, in 
similar terms, the ultimate edition (HL MacQueen and J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (n 27) 262. See 
also WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edn Thomson/W. Green 2007) 679-680; Gloag and 
Henderson, The Law of Scotland (n 6) 219-223. 
41 HL MacQueen and J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (n 27) 262; G Black, Woolman on Contract (4th 
edn W. Greens 2010) 150-152. 
42 HL MacQueen and J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (n 27) 262. 
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are not utilised by one of the parties (or, more precisely, by one of the parties that is contractually 
wielding more bargaining power) ‘in terrorem of the offending party’. In this case, the penalty would 
not be enforceable, other than as a legitimate and genuine means of pre-estimating the damage 
flowing from the breach, in which case exclusively the penalty would be enforceable. In Scots law, 
therefore, the Court is well empowered to exercise a control on these clauses, on equitable ground, on 
refusing to give them effect, and this has been a quite entrenched concepts with several and 
multifarious applications.43 On this aspect, it is also highlighted by Scots Scholars44 that the ‘general 
tendency of the court is not to find that the clause is penal unless it is clearly exorbitant.’45 In any case, 
‘it can only be a penal clause if it arises on breach of contract’. 
Judicially, for instance, the case Hannan v Henderson46 may be a lucid example. In a partnership, a 
clause embodied in the partnership contract entitled each of the parties to terminate the contract for 
the breach of the contract of one of the other partners. In these circumstances, the capital given to the 
partnership by the defaulted partner would have been forfeited. This was held as a penalty clause, 
therefore unenforceable. Practically, it is also synthesised among Scottish commentators that, as 
regards penalty clauses, the ‘general tendency of the court is not to find that the clause is penal unless 
it is clearly exorbitant.’47, and in any case, ‘it can only be a penal clause if it arises on breach of 
contract’48 However, it is also acknowledged that the distinction between the two dogmas (penalty 
and liquidated damages) is difficult to apply in practice, for some practical aspects. Among the 
perplexities of this Commentator as to the general theories of the penalty clauses, 49 the following one 
may be emphasised: 
‘The phrase “in terrorem” is somehow extreme, because it is difficult to imagine most 
“penalty” clauses producing fright, fear, dread, panic or terror. However, in so far as they put 
                                                            
43 (1879) 7 R. 380. Among Commentators, see WM Gloag, The Law of Contract (2nd edn W. Green 1929) 671. 
44 ibid. on recalling City Inn Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd (2003) SLT 885. 
45 G Black, Woolman on Contract (41) 150. 
46 (1879) 7 R. 380. 
47 G Black, Woolman on Contract (n 41) 150. 
48 G Black, Woolman on Contract, ibid, in recalling City Inn Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd (2003) SLT 885. 
49 WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (n 40) 685. 
12 
 
pressure on one party, this is also achieved by a liquidated damages clause. Contracts have, 
by their nature, a coercive force, and this is all the stronger when the sum payable on breach 
is fixed in the mind of the party who might be in breach. To distinguish between different 
degrees of pressure is not easy.’[emphasis added] 
Ultimately, the demarcation line between the two concepts remains slim, somewhat invisible and 
probably evanescent.50  
In light of these perplexities surrounding the concept of the penalty clause, it is possible to deduce that 
the test of the enforceable penalty versus the unenforceable one, as shaped by Lord Dunedin in the 
long-established dictum Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co51, would not 
prevent a proper deposit from being encapsulated within the Scottish missives. This is particularly so 
given the fact that one of the practical applications of this concept already exists in Scots law. This is 
the notion of the ‘forfeiture clause’, in other words sums to be paid under a contract, such as deposits, 
booking fees and instalments.52  
Ultimately, it is possible to assume that, despite the ontological presence of the deposit within the 
general theory of the contract, the two areas of Scots law - the conveyancing law and the law of 
contract respectively, have never managed to fully and adequately assimilate with each other on this 
                                                            
50 Remarkably, in some areas (securities), Scots statute does not refrain from taking a clear-cut position on 
penalty clauses attached to bonds, as per the Debts Securities (Scotland) Act 1856, particularly ss 5 and 7, 
allowing the court “to modify and restrict such penalties [for not payment, over and above performance; n.d.r.], 
so as not to exceed the real and necessary expenses incurred in making the debt effectual.” In this respect see 
amplius WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (n 40) 686,687 as well as Gloag and Henderson, The 
Law of Scotland (n 6) 221. Similarly, as regards the agricultural lease for the payment of the increased rent or 
other liquidated damages for breach of the terms of the lease, see the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991, 
s. 48 (Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (n 6) 221). 
51  [1915] AC 79. Judicially, the concept is consolidated and further defined in both Lord Elphinstone v 
Monkland Iron and Coal Co Ltd (1886) 13 R. (H.L.) 98 and Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v 
Castaneda (1903) 5 F. 1016, in this latter case the penalty clause being equal to a million for a failure to build a 
house worth £ 5!  
Among Scholars, see also WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (n 40) 685. 
52 With clarify, this is emphasised by HL MacQueen and J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (n 27) 264. The 
dictum Zemhunt (Holdings) Ltd. v Control Securities plc (1992) SLT 151, where it was stated that the deposit is 
‘a pledge or guarantee of performance by the purchasers and was not merely an advance of part of the purchase 
price’, might have been a precedent applicable to missives, if it had not referred to a totally different scenario, 
namely a private auction for the purchase of heritable property. ‘Zenhunt’, in its narrative, does not call upon 
any concept of arrha either. 
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subject.53 As a result of this lack of cohesion, the contractual ‘phenomenon’ of liquidated damages, of 
a purely contractual nature, as above hinted, has never successfully materialised and never 
consolidated in the specific contract concerned with the transfer of heritable properties in Scotland. 
Conversely, this concept is perceived as ‘mysterious’, just to paraphrase verbatim, once again, the 
commonly-held view of the most prominent Scottish jurists on the subject.  
Therefore, from an aetiological point of view, it is entirely plausible that Scots law, in its strenuous 
attempt to distance itself from the historic legal ‘enemy’ located ‘South of the Border’, where the 
deposit attached to the sale of properties is quite entrenched, has unexpectedly ended up losing touch, 
on the one hand, with its Institutional Writers, on the other hand, with it Roman roots and with its 
contemporary civil law counterparts. Needless to say, in this case the counterpart is the Italian one, 
here assumed as comparator, at least in its abstract model.54 
 
4. A diachronic perspective and a comparative analysis about the 
deposit  
Is there any legal avenue offering a solution or explanation to the possible incongruity, somehow 
affecting the Scottish contract and conveyancing law in the matter of the deposit? The answer is yes. 
The reason for such optimism surprisingly originates from both the Roman roots and, in terms of 
comparative analysis, a civil law jurisdiction such as that operating in Italy.  
4.1. The deposit and its predecessor: the Roman arrha 
The Roman emptio venditio was a contract, probably the most important one, based on three elements: 
(a) the conventio, therefore the agreement; b) the merx, the good; (c) the pretium, the price.55 As early 
                                                            
53 C Chessa and P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Le “Missive” nel sistema Giuridico Scozzese e la Caparra Penitenziale 
nella Contrattazione Preliminare in Italia: Riflessioni Diacroniche e Comparatistiche’ (2013)2 Contratto e 
Impresa/Europa 930.  
54 See below Section 4, as regards the Italian caparra confirmatoria.  
55 E Volterra, Istituzioni di Diritto Privato Romano (Edizioni Ricerche 1961) 498. 
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as Gaius,56 this contract would have been defined as a consensual, bilateral agreement. In force of it, a 
party, the seller, committed himself to transfer the ‘peaceful’ and ‘definite’ availability of a good (the 
Latin merx, if a movable), and the other party, the buyer, committed himself to transfer the full 
ownership of an amount of money.57 More in general, it can be affirmed that, in the sale of heritable 
properties in the classical period, the emptio venditio would be separate from the traditio,58 the latter 
being ‘the subsequent conveyance and payment by which these obligations were fulfilled …’.59 
In Roman law, since its inception, the sale was accompanied by the practice of giving an arrha, 
symbolizing the seriousness of the bargain.60 In classical law the arrha would have been merely for 
evidentiary purposes, although in Eastern systems ‘a right to withdraw on forfeit of arra seems to 
have been a general rule.’61  However, with Constantine, this twofold approach (emptio venditio 
accompanied by the arra), flourished during the Diocletian period, seems to fade away. At this point, 
the Roman sale and a purchase agreement became merely a consensual contract, hinged upon the 
                                                            
56 Gai 3. 139-141; E. Betti, Istituzioni di diritto romano, II, 1, Cedam, 1960, 200; G. Grosso, Il sistema romano 
dei contratti, Utet, 1950, 240;  
57 M Talamanca, Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (Giuffre’ Editore 1990) 582; M. Talamanca, L’arra nella 
compravendita in diritto greco e in diritto romano, Giuffrè, 1953, 58; M. Massei, L’arra nella compravendita, 
BIDR, 1948, 267.  
58 M Talamanca, Istituzioni di diritto Romano (Giuffre’ Editore 1990) 583. 
59 HF Jolowicz and B Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (3rd edn Cambridge at the 
University Press 1972) 144. 
As regards broad references to the evolution of Roman law, see G Pacchioni, Corso di Diritto Romano (2nd edn 
Unione Tipografica-Editrice Torinese 1918); P Du Plessis, Studying Roman Law (2012 Bristol Classical Press); 
HF Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge at the University Press 1952); U 
Laffi, Studi di Storia Romana e di Diritto (Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura 2001); W Kunkel, An Introduction to 
Roman Legal and Constitutional History translated by JM Kelly (2nd edn based on the 6th German edn Oxford 
at the Clarendon Press 1973). 
60 G Pugliese with F Sitzia and L Vacca, Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (2nd edn, G. Giappichelli Editore 1990) 
896. It is reminded that the giving of an arra was not prescribed by any rule, and it was not a necessary element 
for the sale to be valid.  
61 See G Pugliese, with F Sitzia and L Vacca, Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (2nd edn, G Giappichelli Editore 
1990) 896. See also WW Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian (Third Edition 
revised by Peter Stein) (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2007 – digitally printed version) 481; Id., A Text-
Book of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian (WM W Gaunt 1921 – digitally printed version 1990) 478; 
JAC Thomas, The Institutes of Justinian. Text, Translation and Commentary (Juta & Company Limited 1975) 
231.  
For specific references to the emptio venditio in Roman law, see D Johnston, Roman Law in Context 
(Cambridge University Press 1999) 79-83. 
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agreement of the parties and the payment of the price, with the writing becoming a requirement as far 
as immovable goods are concerned.62  
The arrha was either money – and in this case it would have amounted to a deposit - or some other 
non-fungible goods.63  If the arrha had consisted of money, in case of performance the relevant 
amount would have been credited to the purchaser against the price. Remarkably, the earnest money 
might have been something valuable, and in this case it would have been a deposit that the purchaser 
would have forfeited, relative to his lack of performance of the obligations at the closing date. It is 
emphasised by a Commentator64 that, in case of the seller’s default, under Roman law it was not so 
clear how the matter would be settled. The relevant sources are contradictory in this respect, although 
the Ancient Greek tradition, later on exported to Rome, would have certainly required the seller to 
return twice the amount of arrha received. Probably, based on what clarified later under this Section 
as regards the Italian jurisdiction, where the defaulted seller must return twice the arrha (or caparra) 
received, the Romans might have had a system similar to the some modern Continental jurisdictions. 
The arrha was never considered requisite in Roman law for the conclusion of contracts of sale. This 
seems to be confirmed by Gaius:65 
‘… quamvis nondum pretium numeratum sit, ac ne arra quidem data fuerit ….’66 
This Gaius’ statement, within the Digest of Justinian (Book XVIII, Title I – De Contrahenda 
Emptione) is synthesised as follows: 
                                                            
62 M Talamanca, Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (Giuffre’ Editore 1990) 583. 
63 P du Plessis, Roman Law (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 267-268. In the past, some Scottish jurists 
(J MacKintosh, The Roman Law of Sale (T&T Clark Law Publishers 1892) 68) reconnected the arrha ‘to the 
Hebrew name of earnest (‘érávón, the pledge) into Greece and Italy’. Later, the word became αρραβών in 
ancient Greek, ‘and this is copied in early Latin, but in the jurists the form is always arra’.  
It is also observed, (J MacKintosh, ibid. 68), in recalling Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch. D. At p. 102, that:  
‘[T]he resemblance of our word ‘earnest’ (in Welsh ‘ernes.’, in Scotch ‘arles’) may be accidental’.  
64 P du Plessis, Roman Law (n 57) 268. 
65 Institutiones Gai 3.139. 
66 Basically, but not literally, translated: ‘A contract of sale is concluded when the parties agree on the price. It 
makes no difference if it is not then paid, of if no token of agreement is given.’ 
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‘Quod saepe arrae nomine pro emptione datur, non eo pertinet, quasi sine arra conuentio nihil 
proficiat, sed ut euidentius probari possit conuenisse de pretio.’  
This is translated by a Scottish jurist of the ninetieth century:67 
‘It is common in making a purchase to give something by way of earnest, not because the agreement 
would be ineffectual without earnest, but to serve as a positive proof that the parties are at one as to 
the price.’ 
Having said that, more difficult is to establish the function of the arra within the emptio venditio. 
Whereas it was merely proof of serious intent68 at least in the classical period69, as legacy of the Greek 
tradition in the Mediterranean areas, 70  in the future it would emerge, upon consensus of the 
contractual parties, to be a proper forfeit in case of withdrawal.  
Interestingly, an isolated Author71 seems to look at the trajectory of the arrha in Roman law in a 
slightly different way. In fact, it is affirmed 72  that the traditional form of arrha, called arra 
confirmatoria, in the Justinian times, might have evolved in a second genre, arra contractu imperfecto 
data. The purpose of the latter was to create ‘a certain tie between the negotiating parties who are in 
treaty with a view to effecting the sale’. The characteristic of this alternate arrha was that it was given 
‘not upon the completion of the contract but during the preliminaries, and was held to be merely 
evidence of willingness to complete the contract’73. In this case, according to the this Author ‘[e]ither 
party was at liberty to draw back from the projected sale if he chose to incur a penalty, and the law, in 
that event, made the earnest the measure of damages to be paid by the party refusing to go on.’ 
                                                            
67 J MacKintosh (57) 69. 
68 P du Plessis, Roman Law (n 57) 268. An acceptable translation in English of the Institutiones Gai may be 
found in The Institutes of Gaius, Translated with an introduction by WM Gordon and OF Robinson (Cornell 
University Press 1988) 343-344.  
69 WW Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian (Third Edition revised by Peter Stein) 
(n 55) 481. 
70 M Volterra,    498. 
71 JAC Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (n 66) 280. See amplius the same Commentator in Id., The Institutes of 
Justinian. Text, Translation and Commentary (Juta & Company Limited 1975) 231. 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid. 
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Further, some Authors make a point of drawing attention to the fact74 that the arrha was, in Roman 
law, the legacy of a tradition established by Ancient Greek legal systems, quite established in the 
Mediterranean areas:75 because the sale was not consensual, a deposit would have been required for 
any sale of properties in order to provide the vendor with some form of protection.  
4.2. The arrha in the civil law tradition: Italy and the caparra 
Both conceptually and etymologically, the arrha has left a lasting imprint on some civil law 
jurisdictions, such as the Italian one, where the sale of heritable properties is usually accompanied by 
the caparra. Clearly, the Latin arrha resonates in a language (Italian) with which its lineage is 
incontrovertible, in the light of the fact that caparra is merely the portmanteaux of the word arrha, in 
its accusative declension, and the verb capere, therefore capere arrham, to receive the earnest.76 
More specifically, in the Italian Civil Code77, in resemblance to the previous Italian code of 186578, 
there is a legal provision, article 1382, setting forth the principle broadly applicable to all contracts, 
not merely to those relating to the transfer of immovable goods.79 According to this, a clause whereby 
the parties agree that, in case of a non-performance or tardy performance of the obligations entailed to 
that contract, one of the parties is bound by an agreed alternate performance, that clause results in 
limiting the damages to that agreed alternate performance. In this case, the aggrieved party shall be 
                                                            
74 JAC Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (North-Holland Publishing Company 1976) 280. 
75 E Volterra, Istituzioni di Diritto Privato Romano (Edizioni Ricerche 1961) 499. 
76 Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani (1949) vol VIII, ‘caparra’, 829. 
77 Henceforth also the ‘ICC’.  
78 It is recalled (Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani (n 38) 829-830) that the Italian civil code of 1865, now replaced 
by the ICC, at its art 1217, used to refer to a caparra. See C Chessa and P de Gioia-Carabellese (n 53) 933.   
79 See, among the main Italian prival law textbooks: E. Lucchini, Caparra confirmatoria, recesso e risoluzione 
del contratto, Riv. dir. civ., Cedam, 2009, II, 327; G. Lener, Quale sorte per la caparra confirmatoria 
manifestamente eccessiva? Foro it.,  2014, 2042-2047.   
See, in the Italian literature, see FP Patti, ‘Il Controllo Giudiziale della Caparra Confirmatoria’ (2014)60 Rivista 
di Diritto Civile 685-707; V Viti, ‘I Rapporti fra Caparra Confirmatoria e Risarcimento del Danno’  [2014] 
Giurisprudenza Italiana 2423-2433; L Pascucci, ‘Sulla Proponibilità della Domanda di Risoluzione Corredata da 
una Richiesta di Incameramento della Caparra Confirmatoria’ [2014] Giurisprudenza Italiana 2697-2705; P de 
Biase, ‘La Derogabilità della Disciplina Legale della Caparra Confirmatoria’ (2013)34 Rassegna di Diritto 
Civile 633-351; A Marini, Caparra (Diritto Civile), Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani (Treccani 1988); G De 
Nova, Clausola Penale, in Digesto Discipline Private (Sezione Civile) II (UTET 1988) 377 ff.  
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entitled to receive exclusively the alternate agreed performance (the specified penalty), unless the 
parties initially reached agreement on the recovery of the additional damages. The ‘alternate agreed 
performance’, set forth by the ICC, art 1382, is referred to in Italian as clausola penale which can be 
translated, mutatis mutandis, as deposit or, in literal terms, penal clause80. This is, essentially, a sum, 
in lieu of the actual damages, that the aggrieved party is entitled to receive from the other party.  
The relevant tenor of article 1382 of the ICC is as follows: 
‘A clause by which it is agreed that in case of non-performance or delay of performance one 
of the contracting parties is liable for a specified penalty, has the effect of limiting the 
compensation to the promised penalty, unless compensation was agreed on for additional 
damages.’ 
Ancillary to the penal clause prescribed under article 1382 of the ICC are two further provisions. The 
first is encompassed within the following paragraph of article 1382, according to which: 
‘The penalty is due regardless of proof of damages’.  
The second is conversely contained within article 1383 (under the heading ‘Prohibition against 
cumulation’), according to which: 
‘The creditor cannot demand both the principal performance and the penalty, unless the 
penalty was stipulated for mere delay.’ 
                                                            
80 Such is the suggestion of P Beltramo, The Italian Civil Code (Oceana 2005). 
In Italian law it is common to differentiate between the penal clause (clausola penale), which gives rise to the 
obligation to deliver either money or a quantity of goods (see S Mazzarese, La Clausola Penale, in P 
Schlesinger (ed), Il Codice Civile. Commentario (Giuffre' 1999), and the caparra confirmatoria (confirmatory 
deposit). The latter is usually categorised as a ‘real contract’. It is perfected with the delivery of the res (M Della 
Casa, La Caparra Confirmatoria, in V Roppo (ed), Trattato del Contratto, V (Giuffre' 2006). Therefore, the 
confirmatory deposit is given, it is not merely promised. See G Amadio & F Macario, Diritto Civile: Norme, 
Questioni, Concetti, Vol I (Zanichelli Bologna 2014) 432 ff; F Roselli, Clausola Penale e Caparra, in M 
Bessone (ed), Trattato di Diritto Privato (Giappichelli Editore 2002); S Mazzarese, Clausola Penale. Articoli 
1382-1384, in P Schlesinger (ed), Codice Civile. Commentario (Giuffrè 1999); F Gabrielli, La Pena 
Contrattuale (Giuffrè 1991). C. Chessa, Il potere giudiziale di ristabilire l’equità contrattuale nelle transazioni 
commerciali, Riv. dir. civ., II, 2006, 439; G. Schiavone,  Funzione della clausola penale e potere di riduzione da 
parte del giudice, Resp. civ. prev., 2006, I, 61.   
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Having said that, in respect to the principle and in paying particular attention to the specific subject of 
the transfer of immovable goods (mainly properties), it is worth noting that the legal provisions set 
forth  under article 1385 of the ICC (headed ‘caparra confirmatoria’81) prescribe that, if at the 
conclusion of the contract one party provides the other with a sum of money or other fungible items 
substantiating a deposit (earnest) then, in case of non-performance, the deposit must be returned (to 
the aggrieved party) or, alternatively, imputed to the performance still due. Similarly, in light of 
article 1385(2), if the party who provided the other with the deposit is the non-performing one, then 
the other party (the performing party or, at least the party available to perform) shall be entitled to 
withdraw or rescind the contract by retaining the deposit (earnest).82 
The concept emphasised under article 1385 of the ICC, with regard to the ‘confirming deposit’, is 
particularly pertinent and telling when conducting an analysis of the utilisation of the earnest within 
the context of a contract of sale relating to immovable properties in Italy. In that jurisdiction, which 
essentially functions in keeping with the process in Scotland, the sale of a property is preceded by 
missives. The only difference is basically the terminology adopted; in Italy the missive is called 
contratto preliminare, or preliminary contract. The concept of contratto preliminare is hinged upon 
the legal provision of article 1351 of the ICC (headed ‘preliminary contract’), according to which ‘a 
preliminary contract is void if it is not made in the form that the law requires for the definitive 
contract.’83 The preliminary contract is usually concluded three or four months prior to the closing 
                                                            
81  Basically confirming deposit or, more literally and as suggested by an Author (Beltramo (n 61)), the 
confirming earnest. 
82 Article 1385(2) of the ICC literally prescribes:  
‘If the party who gave the deposit is in default, the other can rescind (withdraw) from the contract, by 
retaining the deposit’ (our translation) 
The second part of the same article keeps on prescribing as follows: 
‘If the party who received the deposit is in default, the other one can rescind (withdraw from) the 
contract and claim back double the amount of the deposit’ (our translation).  
For sake of clarity, the final third paragraph of article 1385 of the ICC should be recalled:  
‘However, if the party who is not in default prefers to demand performance or dissolution of the 
contract, compensation for damages is regulated by the general rules.’ 
83 See G Alpa & V Zeno-Zencovich, Italian Private Law (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 222-223; R. TRIOLA, 
Contratto preliminare di vendita di immobili, Giuffrè, 2014; V. Vitalone, La contrattazione preliminare, 
Giappichelli, 2009; G. Bozzi, Il contratto preliminare, Utet, 2007; G. Gabrielli, Contratto preliminare, Enc. 
Giur. Treccani, 1997.  
It is worth adding the in Italy too, the preliminary contract (article 1470 of the ICC) is a consensual contract 
producing the transfer of the property as a result of the mere consent (article 1376 of the ICC), which does not 
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date. The latter is basically the date of the actual transference of the ownership, with payment of the 
price in the hands of a notary public and ensuing registration of the new owner with the competent 
land register.  
More practically, it is worth noting that it is unlikely that in Italy the seller will conclude the 
preliminary contract, unless the buyer is available to pay a confirmed deposit (a caparra 
confirmatoria, according to the terminology of the ICC referred to above). The actual amount of the 
confirmed deposit depends on the bargaining power existing between the parties, although typically in 
the neighbourhood of twenty per cent of the value of the property to be transferred.84 Instinctively, the 
higher is the ‘negotiating power’ of the seller, the higher the ‘confirmed deposit’ shall turn out to be. 
This shall happen in cases where the demand for the target property is so strong that the seller is in a 
position to reject the offer of a contratto preliminare (the Italian missives) accompanied by a risible 
confirmed deposit, seemingly because there is - or there will be soon - another potential buyer 
available to acquire the property at a higher confirmed deposit.  Incidentally, from a survey conducted 
in preparation to this work among notaries public in Italy, there has emerged that a deposit or caparra 
fits into ninety per cent of the contratti preliminari relating to the transfer of immovable properties in 
that country. 
From what above escribed, it becomes starkly obvious that the scenario greeting the Italian seller is 
better than that greeting his Scottish counterpart. The Italian missives are not merely theoretically 
binding, but also de facto. If the Italian buyer decided, subsequent to the missives being concluded, to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
necessarily coincide with the integral payment of the final price (A Luminoso, La compravendita (Giappichelli 
2015). 
Within the vast italian literature relating to the preliminary contract in that jurisdiction, reference can be made to: 
C Cicero, ‘Il Concetto di Pre-preliminare nel Procedimento di Formazione del Contratto “a Tutele Crescenti”’ 
(2015)69 Rivista del Notariato 608-631; CA Mussi, ‘Il Contratto Preliminare di Vendita Immobiliare ad “Effetti 
Anticipati”’  [2015] Contratti 375-393; P Porchi, ‘Errore, Inadempimento, Vizi di Diritto e Contratto 
Preliminare di Vendita’ (2015) Contratti 343-354; G Recinto, ‘Recenti questioni in |Tema di Contratto 
Preliminare: l’Esecuzione Anticipata’ [2015] Rivista di Diritto dell’Impresa’ 49-63; R Mazzariol, ‘Il Contratto 
Preliminare di Preliminare: la Parola Passa alle Sezioni Unite’ (2014)30 La Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile 
Commentata 736-741;  V Mancinelli, ‘Consegna Anticipata della Cosa ed Inefficacia del Contratto Preliminare 
di Vendita’ [2014] Contratti 156-163; M Tamburini, ‘Una Inesauribile Fonte di Dubbi: il Contratto Preliminare 
di Preliminare’ [2014] Giurisprudenza Italiana 2419-2422; D Pittella, ‘Il Contratto Preliminare “ad Effetti 
Anticipati”: Inquadramento Giuridico e Disciplina’ [2013] Notariato 59-71.   
84 C Chessa and P de Gioia-Carabellese (n 53) 935. 
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withdraw from the contract without good reason, the seller would be entitled to the full ‘confirming 
deposit’. Although the confirming deposit is not mandatory, rather a mere option, it must be 
remembered, though, that in Italy, the practice to include within preliminary contracts also a 
‘confirmed deposit’ given by the buyer is basically the norm. 
Similarly, in Italy, the buyer would think twice before withdrawing from the preliminary contract as 
he would be fully aware that, by doing so, the first legal act of ‘retaliation’ legitimately employed by 
the seller would be to retain the ‘confirming deposit’. It is likely that the seller shall retain the 
confirmed deposit, with the buyer being – merely – entitled to start a legal action aimed to dispute that 
the retention of the confirmed deposit is not legal, because inter alia the buyer's withdrawal from the 
preliminary contract was justified (eg the property forming the subject of the transfer is affected by 
defects not disclosed by the seller at the time of the missives). The circumstances are exceptional, 
though, as the buyer usually represents in writing that the property has been fully inspected by the 
buyer himself and is suitable for the purposes of his habitability or any other purpose connected with 
the legal nature of that property.85 
4.3. Asymmetries and inconsistencies between Scots law and Continental 
tradition 
From a broader perspective and in glancing at this legal analysis outside the Edinburgh-Rome axis, it 
can be ascertained that – to probably corroborate the same stances of this contribution - the 
experiences encountered by further Civilian jurisdictions, such as the French and the Spanish ones, do 
not differ by the ‘comparator’ utilised in this research. The concept of preliminary contract – and 
relevant deposit or arrha - is well known in other Civilian jurisdictions, such as the French one and 
the Spanish one. As regards the former, it is emphasised as follows86: 
‘For existing properties, a preliminary contract known as a "compromise" or "promesse de 
vente" (promise of sale) is signed. The preliminary contract commits both the seller and the 
                                                            
85 C Chessa and P de Gioia-Carabellese (n 53) 934-935. 
86 S Glock, Real Property Law Project – France (European University Institute) 27 
<http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Law/ResearchAndTeaching/ResearchThemes/ProjectRealProperty
Law.aspx#RPRC> accessed on 31 October 2012. 
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buyer to the transaction and the stated price, subject to a number of conditions precedent, or 
"conditions suspensive" and a seven-day cooling-off period. When the contract is signed, the 
purchaser pays a deposit, usually between 5% and 10% of the purchase price. The preliminary 
contract sets out the exact conditions of sale.’ [emphasis added] 
In Scotland, conversely, as no ‘confirming deposit’ is usually agreed at the time of the transfer of the 
property, nor is the concept legislated upon,87 the non-performing buyer could wriggle free from the 
ostensive binding missives, as he is aware that no power of retention is given to the seller (as already 
emphasised, no money has been given to him at the time of the missives). Of course, a legal 
prerogative remains with the seller to sue the buyer. In this case the avenue on which to do so would 
be to rely on his creditworthiness. However, this circumstance, as mentioned above,88 cannot be taken 
for granted if the ostensive buyer was not the real party interested in the purchase. 
To summarise the diachronic and comparative deliberations thus far pursued through the analysis of 
both Roman law and one of the most prominent civil legal systems (the Italian), it is worth drawing 
attention to some interesting observations: 
a. The Scottish legal system, for some reason, despite its self-proclaimed ‘Roman’ roots, has 
abstained from introducing, in its commonest consensual contract (the sale of heritable 
properties), the concept of arrha. Conversely, the Roman tradition has held the arrha to be, 
together with the stipulation in writing, a salient feature of any contract concerned with the 
res, and a viable element to be embodied in any form of contract, written or otherwise.89  
b. ‘North of the Border’, the concept of a ‘deposit’ in the missives, albeit not opposed on 
theoretical grounds, is still perceived at an authoritative level to be ‘mysterious’. Such a 
conclusion is argued in the present work; the diachronic analysis carried out in this work has 
                                                            
87 It is intuitive that the lack of a concept of a confirming deposit means that the contracting parties, particularly 
the seller, are not aware of the possibility to ask for it.  
88 See particularly Section 2 above. As regards the ‘ordinary’ judicial remedies for the breach of missives on the 
part of the seller, see in Scots law DJ Cusine and R Rennie, Missives (n 2) 231-265. 
89 It must be specified that in Roman law the arrha was concept applicable to all the contracts, either written or 
verbal. (WW Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian (Third Edition revised by Peter 
Stein) (n 55) 481.  
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brought to light that both Institutional Writers did refer to the arra or deposit, ergo the 
concept should not be mysterious.90 
c. The peculiarity of the Scottish legal system, with its apparent but not rare unwillingness to 
encompass Roman concepts in its legal system (in this case, the arrha or the deposit in the 
sale of heritable properties, as a salient feature of the missives concluded before the 
settlement),91 seems to be accentuated by the fact that other proper civil law jurisdictions, 
such as the Italian one used above as a comparator, not only succeeded in this implementation, 
but also managed to theorise it (as caparra confirmatoria) across the spectrum of the different 
contracts. The phenomenology narrated in this work, as regards the possible asymmetries 
existing in Scots law in the matter of the arrha, would not be so isolated, and might 
reverberate in some further sample, such as the unilateral promises.92 
d. Finally and in a something of a paradox, even the English legal system, where missives or 
indeed any form of preliminary contract (to use the Italian or French legal terminology, 
compromesso or compromis being the colloquial wording in each language, respectively) is 
missing in the sale of heritable properties and where the Roman tradition historically has not 
exerted (or, rectius, should not have exercised) any influence whatsoever, does not totally rule 
out the deposit in the sale of heritable properties. 93  By way of a probably speculative 
                                                            
90 See Section 2.1 above, as well as Section 3. In a nutshell, the Institutional Writers, particularly Stair and 
Erskine, clearly evoke the ‘deposit’ and its own Roman ties to the arrha. However, they do so in connection to 
the general consensual contracts, rather than to the specific missives in the sale of heritable properties. 
91 Remarkably, the Roman arrha narrated in this work is not a rare case of missing, misleading transplant and/or 
uncultivated development of a Roman concept within Scots law. Similarly and as regards the Roman notion of 
res domino perit (ergo, the time when the transference of the risk from the seller to the buyer as regards a 
heritable property occurs), see Sloans Dairies Limited v Glasgow Corporation 1976 SLT 147.  
92 L Vagni, La Promessa in Scozia (Giuffre' Editore 2008). See also, from a broader perspective, R Evans-Jones, 
‘Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of the Genius of Scots Private Law’ (1998)114(4) Law 
Quarterly Review 1-15. 
93 K Gray and SF Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th ed, OUP 2008) 1042. It is not a condition precedent; 
however, it is a contractual term that, if breached, ‘entitles the injured party to sue for damages including the 
unpaid deposit.’ Judicially, see Millichamp v Jones [1982] 1 WLR 1422 at 1430 G-H; Alarm Facilities Ply Ltd v 
Jackson Constructions Ply Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 22 at 28F-29A. In England, the applicable piece of legislation 
shall be the Law of Property Act 1925. In a prospective anti-gazumping legislation, so far never materialised in 
England and Wales, a mandatory deposit equal to 0.5 per cent of the purchase price would be the possible 
solution. F Gray and SF Gray, ibid. 1042-1043. 
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interpretation and in looking back at the diachronic explanations of this Section, it may be 
assumed – albeit tangentially - that the Anglo-Welsh system may have adopted directly the 
structure of the Ancient Greek legal systems, where the contract of sale of properties was 
binding no earlier than the payment of the price and the transfer of the property. In that 
context, in modern England as in the Ancient Greek cities (and differently from the Roman 
tradition), the deposit would have been (or is still) the price for the booking of the property.94 
The points elucidated above may aid in shaping a view - albeit speculative - that Scottish law may 
have developed over the centuries, particularly in the last three centuries, in this area (the sale of 
heritable properties) and particularly in respect to the arrha (or deposit), a very autonomous micro-
system of rules and principles, on the one hand somehow different from the common law system, on 
the other hand and quite paradoxically, with a sort of annihilation of an important pillar of the Roman 
tradition, the arrha.95 
  
5. A theoretical ‘confirmed deposit’ with the Scottish missives 
Any possible comparative analysis between and/or among jurisdictions, particularly in cases where 
the jurists propose Draconian ‘transplants’ rather than a mere juxtaposition of concepts, must be 
undertaken with the utmost care. Having said that, the possibility to partly amend the Scottish 
legislation in light of what other jurisdictions have done cannot be roundly dismissed, but rather 
should be given theoretical consideration especially when bearing in mind possible economic 
ramifications tied to the protection of the property market and its credibility. If also a transplant were 
not conceptually accepted in this matter, because deemed not practicable by the practitioners or 
simply not necessary, at least a mere simulation might show in what the Scottish legal system in this 
area might have substantiated if, three centuries ago, it had not steadily but inexorably abandoned its 
Roman routes. 
                                                            
94 Among Scholars, see M Paulowski, ‘Return of Deposit’ (2008)209 18-20. 
95 C Chessa and P de Gioia-Carabellese (n 53) 937-939.  
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First and foremost, the current Scottish jurisdiction, which does not expressly contemplate the 
possibility for the parties to transfer - from the buyer to the seller - money in the form of a deposit at 
the time of the conclusion of the missives, would theoretically recognise the official concept of the 
‘deposit’. The tenor of the relevant article of this legislation 96 , certainly speculative in its 
theorisation,97 could be - or might have been, more realistically - as follows: 
‘At the time of the conclusion of the missives, the committed parties may agree that the 
prospective buyer provides the prospective seller with a deposit, the "Confirmed Deposit". 
The Confirmed Deposit shall be imputed to the price of the property, if the sale is concluded; 
otherwise, the seller is entitled to retain it as damages for the prospective buyer's unjustified 
refusal to proceed to the final purchase. The parties may agree that the Confirmed Deposit 
does not prevent the aggrieved party from claiming further damages.’ 
As a result of this, where the transfer of a confirmed deposit upon conclusion of the missives is 
merely optional, the seller of a property in Scotland would be eventually bestowed with a “gift” (the 
binding nature of the missives) which so far is probably just a too much accentuated legend, at least 
from a practical perspective, as demonstrated above. In fact, the seller who has signed off on missives 
into which a confirmed deposit is subsumed would be safe in the knowledge that the prospective 
buyer would attach serious weight to any thought of withdrawing from the missives, due to the 
immediate financial repercussions which would inevitably befall him by way of retention of the 
deposit.  
Critically speaking, one cannot refrain from noting that a buyer in a position to provide the 
prospective seller with a confirmed deposit at the time of the missives is a rarity, due to the fact that 
the buyer, in buying a property, usually relies on the support of a bank and particularly on the 
mortgage which is granted, via the buyer's solicitor, in the juncture immediately preceding the closing 
                                                            
96 In an even more speculative way, the prospective legislation at stake could encompass, in Scotland, an 
organic set of principles and legal provisions applicable to the subject of the sale of heritable property, in a 
jurisdiction where an overall piece of legislation in this matter is missing, and probably, more realistically, will 
always be missing.   
D Brand, AJM Steven and S Wortley, Professor McDonald’s Conveyancing Manual (n 25) 537. 
97 C Chessa and P de Gioia-Carabellese (n 53) 939-941.  
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date. This perplexity is understandable, although it does not appear a serious obstacle to the 
theoretical discussion at stake. However, despite this, it should be conceded that in the current 
economic climate (the credit crunch and the ensuing difficulties encountered by customers in gaining 
access to credit) where banks providing the prospective buyer with the required liquidity to buy a 
property are reluctant to finance more than eighty per cent of the value of the property (the remainder 
being a ‘deposit’, to use a non-technical definition), a prospective buyer must be in a position to 
deliver a (significant) cash sum, at the time of his decision to buy a property, as he is well aware that 
the mortgage shall not exceed a certain percentage of the value. This cash sum, contextualised within 
the progressive scenario envisaged in this work, shall be earmarked for transfer by the prospective 
buyer to the prospective seller to confirm, vis-à-vis the latter, that the intention of the former to buy 
the property is a serious undertaking. As a result of this, the seller shall find a source of comfort in the 
transferred deposit as he will know that, should the worst case scenario come to pass (ie the 
prospective buyer's refusal to finalise the purchase), the damage ‘wrought’ by this could to an extent 
be covered by the retention of the confirmed deposit by the aggrieved seller. 
Finally, as the system of the confirmed deposit would be optional, the traditional form of the missives, 
devoid of any confirmed deposit, would continue to exist without, on the face of it, giving rise to any 
inconsistency or overlap.98  Obviously, in this case the prospective seller will be aware that his 
entitlements connected to the sale could be inherently weakened. In essence, if he was aggrieved by a 
withdrawal, his sole recourse would be to unleash a legal claim which could, as clarified above, be 
akin to wielding a blunt instrument! Conversely, in the current system, there is still the likelihood or 
the possibility – but the final say on this is bestowed on the Scottish practitioners – that the seller is 
lured into the missives by the seduction of their enforceability, not realising that in reality he has been 
concurrently entrapped in a ‘golden prison’, the legal action originating from the non-performance 
                                                            
98 It is not a case that in the legal system that we utilised as yardstick, for the purposes of this comparative 
analysis (Italy), the caparra confirmatoria existing in that country is mere optional and not mandatory and it 
coexists with sale and purchase agreements of property where the prospective seller does not transfer anything 
at the time of the missives (rectius: the preliminary contract).  
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being the only tool he can brandish, although with dubious force, in some cases, and certainly with 
elevated legal costs. 
  
6. Conclusions.  
Based on the comparative analysis hitherto undertaken, it has been possible to ascertain that the 
Scottish legal system has managed to create, particularly in comparison to its correspondent 
jurisdiction south of the border, a long-established dogma in the binding nature of missives. It has 
been demonstrated in this work that, in reality, there are stratagems which leave this ‘dogma’ open to 
empirical violation. This is due to the fact that the conclusion of the missives in Scotland are not 
typically accompanied by any deposit to the benefit of the seller, differently from the ‘comparator’ 
(Italy) as well as France and Spain, jurisdictions where a concept very similar to the missives (the 
preliminary contract) does exist.  
Furthermore, it has been identified that the modern Scottish legal system for some reason has thus far 
failed to successfully categorise the concept of the ‘deposit’ within the missives, whereas 
correspondent jurisdictions of Roman tradition (for instance but not only the Italian one), as well as 
the Roman law itself, historically and traditionally recognise this concept as part of the general law of 
contract. More specifically, the correspondent caparra confirmatoria is a partial payment that, upon 
conclusion of the Italian ‘missives’, the buyer pays to the seller, the caparra being forfeited if the 
buyer decided not to settle the final contract. The contractual mechanism, to which the transaction on 
properties in Italy conforms, albeit ontologically belonging to the law of contract, is - and from an 
economic perspective – a form of protection for the seller as it allows him to receive, in case of 
withdrawal, a payment for liquidated damages.99 
                                                            
99 In this respect, the possibility that, as adumbrated sometimes in Scotland (see previous Section 1), the deposit 
is a ‘security’, would end up being dismissed, based on the findings of this work. 
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Quite interestingly, the method of analysis utilised in this work has highlighted that, on the one hand, 
the concept of the ‘deposit’ in the Scottish missives should not be so ‘obscure’, when viewed from 
two perspectives: a diachronic perspective (the Roman roots, its consolidated notion of arrha and the 
fact the same Institutional Writers - at least the ‘initial’ ones - refer to it); a comparative one (the 
Italian jurisdiction, where the caparra fulfils a dual role as both a pre-payment and liquidated 
damages, and has been part of that system since its codification in 1865). On the other hand, the 
ontological nature of the deposit in the Scottish missives having been deemed not so obscure, the 
present work suggests, a possible ‘oneiric’ reading of the Scottish jurisdiction, as if three centuries 
ago it had evolved through the trajectory of a pure Civilian jurisdiction.  
Essentially, in this theoretical simulation, it has been put forward the possibility to shape within Scots 
law a concept of ‘confirming earnest or deposit’ or, to be even more explicit, an arrha consistently 
with the alleged Roman roots of Scots law. The purpose of this revamped Scottish contemporary 
arrha, upon which the parties to the missives would be entitled to agree or not, would practically 
increase the degree of real enforceability of the missive in that jurisdiction, as it happens so 
commonly - and efficiently - in European continental jurisdictions. Needless to say, the final choice 
should be bestowed upon Scottish practitioners, who, however, are made aware, also thanks to the 
findings of this work, that a similar process is already in place in countries such as Italy, France and 
Spain, where the preliminary contract in the transfer of heritable properties  has been part of the 
relevant legal systems for centuries. In actual terms, the Scottish arrha would lend itself as anticipated 
damages that the aggrieved party - usually the seller - would be entitled to retain in cases of 
unjustified withdrawal.  
From a procedural point of view, a prospective, actually impossible, Scottish arra would also be 
fruitful. It would discourage the parties from seeking resolution through the courts, becoming an 
alternative contract dispute mechanism, entailed – optionally, if the parties wanted to - to the sale of 
heritable properties via the missives. Incidentally, as the concept to be legislated upon would 
introduce an optional mechanism to be selected (or not) by the contracting parties in addition to the 
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already existing and widely utilised missive devoid of any confirming deposit (earnest), the 
amendments would not alter the solid foundations of conveyancing law in Scotland. Rather, they 
would simply add a degree of robustness and bring that area of law into line with its historical Roman 
roots100 and - but this is less significant - contemporary Italian legislative counterpart.101 
Ultimately, in the light of the findings of a potentially unfulfilled Scottish legal system, a self-
proclaimed mixed legal system, a question seems to legitimately arise: in order to find a more clear 
ontological identity, should Scots law embark on a Colossal process of re-foundation of its worn 
Roman roots, and also adopt, in what would be probably an anti-historical move, a civil code? 
Otherwise, the real identity of Scots law should be revealed once again: a mainly common law 
system,102 alternative to the counterpart south of the Border because of its own specific and a-typical 
evolution, based also on very, very ancient Roman roots. It is also possible to assume, as an important 
attenuating circumstance for Scots law, that the implementation ‘North of the Border’ of the arrha 
within the missives has been prevented because of the new political scenario emerged as from 1707, 
with the increasing difficulties of the Scottish jurists in keeping the pace with the developments 
occurred in the Continent, including the Napoleonic codification. 
                                                            
100 See previous Section 4. 
101 C Chessa and P de Gioia-Carabellese (n 53) 941-943.  
102 A Rodger, Thinking about Scots Law 1996 1(1) Edinburgh Law Review 3-24. 
